SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
DORIS L\NG ..CQHAN

PRESENT:

'36

PART
JusUc.
INDEX

No.lot(,r-siW/0

MOTION DATE _ _ __

-y-

MOTION SEQ. NO.

The following pipers. numbered 1 to _ _ , were reid on this motion tol1or
Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cauu - Affidavits - Exhibits
Anlwaring Affldavlte ReM'lng Affldavlta

Exhibits

G:;- ~

C-t- ~ ~J

-..,-_at_/_'=S.;...r"Y7.~,/-=:SS;..:.-~_ _ _ _ _ __

if- ~..-r..-iJ)

2

0

'

,
yqlzo/2-

",kr-/~ o.;;;z;;z;:J ~d IIIZ8)2 all .,...
po~ the foregoing pap,,.., It 18 o~.red that thl. motion ... 7"tt q'/J""-" ~ fJ j.5

/n

a. Cc..a.~~

(..,U

/l;? 7"Ae..

Q 03

I NO(.).....I/u,.._~_ _ __
I No(s), 'S', 4
I No(.),
s:

-c;,":"',-;Z---

ZV.otM ~

_/~ct£,.~ -'A."ILJ~,..-~~'/
- ""'"
'
'£,'--'''"4,

~

..../~

-

<Q~

CA.e'C/ S<"",....,,).

FILE 0
AU60 12012

,J.S.C.

1, CHECK ONE: ..................,.... " .. ,....................................,....

0"

o NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

CASE DISPOSED

2. CHECK AS APPROPRIATE: ..........................,MOTION IS: D GRANTED
3. CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: ,.. " .................. ,...... " ........... ,....

DORIS LING .. COHAN

0

0

SETTLE ORDER

0 00 NOT POST

DENIED

o GRANTED IN PART

0

OTHER

D SUBMIT ORDER

o FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT o REFERENCE

, ,
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TRILBY J. TENER, M.D.

Plaintiff,
Index No. 104583/10

-against-

Motion Seq. No.

MIRIAM CREMER, M. D., et al. ,

003

Defendants.

-----------------------------------------x
DORIS LING-COHAN, J.S.C.:

BACKGROUND
This is a

inter

alia,

suit by plaintiff doctor,

two

million

dollars

arising

Trilby J.
out

of

Tener,
an

for,

allegedly

defamatory posting about plaintiff on a website known as and doing
business as

WWW.yitals.com

(Vitals).

Defendant Miriam Cremer,

M.D., moves for an order dismissing the complaint, pursuant to CPLR
3 211 ( a )

( 5 ) and ( 7) .

The single anonymous statement (Statement) which gave rise to
this action was first published on April 12, 2009 on the Vitals
website,

an on-line forum expressly dedicated to opinions about

doctors

so

professionals

that
for

people
the

may

benefit

comment
of

others

information about such professionals.
Tener is a terrible doctor.
skills.

Stay far awayl"

on

and rate medical

seeking

opinions and

The Statement read: IIDr.

She is mentally unstable and has poor

The complaint alleges that plaintiff

discovered the Statement on May 28, 2009, when an on-line search of
her name on the web site www.google.com. referred her to Vitals.

1

DISCUSSION
Dismissal Based on Untimeliness
CPLR 215 (3) provides that claims sounding in libel or slander
must be commenced within one year.
(98

NY2d

365 r

370

publication" ruler
upon

the

first

[2002])

r

In

the

Firth v State of New York

Court

held

that

the

"single

pursuant to which a defamation claim accrues
publication

of

the

offending

applicable to statements posted on the internet.

statement r

ConsequentlYr

plaintiff had until April 11, 2010, to commence this action.
days prior to the expiration date,

on April 8,

is

2010,

A few

plaintiff

filed a summons with notice, naming as defendants Pamela Wilkie,
and a number of "Doe" s, but failed to mention moving defendant, Dr.
Cremer.
date,

It was not until a several months past the expiration

on June 8,

summons r

removing

2010,

however,

Ms.

Wilkie 1 ,

that plaintiff filed an amended
as

a

responsible

party, and

substituting Dr. Cremer.
Plaintiff contends that this action is timely, because it was
commenced pursuant to CPLR 1024.

CPLR 1024 allows a party

who is ignorant, in whole or in part, of the name or
identity of a person who may properly be made a partYr
[to] proceed against such person as an unknown party by
designating so much of his name .and identity as is known.
An

action commenced pursuant to filing under CPLR 1024 tolls the

statute of limitations (Bumpus v New York City Tr. Auth., 66 AD3d
26 [2d Dept 2009]

i

Tucker v Lorieo, 291 AD2d 261 [1st Dept 2002]) /

and CPLR 306-b affords the plaintiff an additional 120 days within
lPamela Wilkie/s name is also spelt "Willkie" in Plaintiffrs
Affidavit in Opposition. (Para.24, Footnote 7).
2

which to identify and to serve the proper defendant.

However, this

extraordinary procedure is not without limits: a plaintiff seeking
to proceed pursuant to CPLR 1024 must "demonstrate[]

that he

[or

she] conducted a diligent inquiry into the actual identities of the
intended defendants before the expiration of the statutory period. "
Goldberg

v

Boatmax: I I, Inc.,

41

AD3d 255, 256 (1st Dept 2007)

(emphasis supplied, citing Tucker v Lorieo, 291 AD2d 261); see also
Erdogan v Toothsavers Dental Servo

P.C.,

57 AD3d 314

(1st Dept

2008). As explained further below,here, plaintiff failed to make
the timely efforts to identify the defendant that would entitle. her
to avail herself of the special procedural mechanism provided by
the CPLR.
The complaint alleges, and plaintiff's affidavit states that,
the day after she read the Statement,
sought to have the Statement expunged.

she contacted Vitals and
Allegedly, she learned that

the best that she could do was to open her own account with Vitals,
which would permit her to

"hide"

the Statement.

According to

plaintiff, she successfully hid the Statement shortly thereafter,
and then continued to seek ways to remove the Statement from the
Vitals web site.
The

complaint

further

alleges

that

plaintiff

"immediately

initiated a proceeding to compel Vitals to provide information"
that would help plaintiff identify the person who had posted the
Statement.

Complaint, at 24.

However, in actuality, plaintiff did

3

..
not commence that proceeding 2 until March 26,

2010

-

almost 10

months after she first discovered the Statement, and only 16 days
before her time to commence this action ran.

3

Indeed, plaintiff

admits in her affidavit that she had the wherewithal to consult an
attorney acquaintance shortly after discovering the posting, who
discouraged her, but only finally retained counsel belatedly on or
about March 23, 2010

(almost 10 months after her discovery of the

statement). Prior to that time,
the

offending

post)

she

(despite her swift action to hide
apparently

merely

confined her

investigation to merely reviewing her e-mails and correspondence,
in attempting to ascertain the
posted the Statement.

identity of the person who had

Such activity, however, does not constitute

2
Such proceeding was
titled In the Matter of Trilby J.
Tener,
M.D.
v
MDX
Medical
Inc.
and/or
its
subsidiary,
www.vitals.com (Index No. 103972/2010) ("Tener v. MDX").

In
Tener v.
MDX,
Hon. Alice Schlesinger
skepticism as to this matter and stated on the record:

expressed

"This matter is before me and it sounds in pre-action
discovery.
When this was first brought in as an order
to show cause, I had some doubts -as to whether or not
I wanted to sign the order to show cause at all because
what it essentially was, was asking for information to
be used in a lawsuit sounding in defamation against, at
this point, an anonymous poster who had made some
unfavorable comments that referred to Dr. Trilby Tener.
She is a medical doctor.
Specifically what those
comments were that Dr. Tener was 'a terrible doctor',
that she had 'poor skills' and that she was 'mentally
unstable' and finally to 'stay far away'.
Presumably
that was a direction to the reader to stay far away .
I had serious doubts because there was a question in my
mind whether those statements would even give rise to
a defamation suit because they sound very much as
opinions as opposed to stating facts and opinion is
protected expression, pursuant to the First Amendment".
4

a

diligent effort to ascertain the identity of the person who

should be a defendant, and plaintiff's last moment retention of an
attorney, less than three weeks before the expiration of the oneyear period, does not make this action timely.
relies upon CPLR 1024,

Where a plaintiff

the plaintiff s efforts to identify the
I

proper defendant are not timely when they are first undertaken
shortly

before

the

occurred herein.
Dept 1999)

i

expiration

of

the

limitations

period,

as

Fountain v Ocean View II Assoc., 266 AD2d 339 (2d

see also Justin v Orahan, 14 AD3d 492 (2d Dept 2005) .

Thus, plaintiff's inexplicable and belated attempts to ascertain
the

true

identity

of

the

poster

do

not

warrant

the

special

protection of CPLR 1024.
Plaintiff

contends that the instant motion is premature,

because this court has not yet held the hearing provided for by the
September

22,

2011

Appellate

Division

decision,

as

to

the

feasibility and cost of the retrieval of certain electronically
stored information by non-party New York University Langone Medical
Center. 'I

See

Tener

v

Cremer,

89 AD3d 75

(1st Dept

2011).

The underlying motion for contempt, which was denied
by this court in its September 9, 2010 decision, was filed by
plaintiff against non-party NYU Langone Medical Center, when, in
response to a subpoena, it had indicated to plaintiff that it could
not retrieve the computer information that plaintiff sought from
such not-for-profit medical institution.
In the appeal of the order denying contempt, the
Appellate Division reversed this court's order dated September 9,
2010 (denying contempt against a non-party), utilizing reply papers
that were submitted to the Appellate Division as part of the
appellate record, which had not been received or used by this Part
(as specifically reflected in this court's September 9, 2010
decision), given that such reply papers were not included in the
motion papers submitted to this Part.
Subsequently, (when this court became aware that
5

the Appellate Division rendered its decision utilizing reply papers
that this court did not have the benefit of reviewing) this court
issued an order dated November 28, 2011, requiring an explanation
as to why the appellate "record" was markedly different than the
submissions before this Part and the court file (having also
reviewed the entire court file, which showed an absence of
plaintiff's reply).
In 'r esponse, significantly, the parties and non-party NYU
Langone Medical Center did not dispute that such reply papers were
not part of the record on which I had based my September 9, 2010
decision/order.
Specifically, while plaintiff has cleared up part of the
mystery of how her reply (which submitted, for the first time, an
expert's affidavit) was made a part of the appellate "record"
(given that it appears that such reply had been submitted to the
prior judge's court attorney, who apparently did not place it with
the motion file or case file, and was missing upon the motion
file's transfer to this Part for decision),
plaintiff has.
nonetheless, utterly not refuted that such reply was never
submitted to this Part , and hence clearly not considered when
rendering the September 9,2010 decision, which denied contempt
against non-party NYU Langone Medical Center.
Nor has plaintiff answered the question of why she simply
did not make a motion to renew/reargue (a routine and inexpensive
procedural mechanism to re-visit an issue before the court), upon
receipt of my September 9, 2010 decision, which clearly indicated
in the recitation of papers portion that only four (4) documents
were considered: "Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause ... 1,2" and
Answering Affidavits ... 3,4", with the "Reply Affidavit" space left
noticeably and intentionally blank. Moreoyer, the body of the
decision specifically mentioned the absence of any reply submitted
by plaintiff: "This [non-party NYU Langone Medical Center's]
allegation is unrefuted as a reply affidavit contradicting such
allegations has not been supplied." (emphasis supplied).
The court notes that attorneys routinely check such
recitation of papers and file such motions to renew/reargue,
regularly. If plaintiff's counsel had employed such a routine
procedural mechanism, considerable resources on all sides,
including his client's financial resources, the defendant's, the
non-party NYU Langone Medical Center's and the Appellate Division's
(which was forced to consider an appellate "record" markedly
different than the submissions provided to this trial judge), would
not have been wasted.
Incredibly, instead of employing this simple procedural
mechanism, plaintiff (who complains of "defamation") and her counsel
have decided that the better avenue to take was to make blatantly
inappropriate and wild accusations against this court of "bias" and
"apparent impropriety",
after allegedly conducting "Internet
research" into this court's background and raising an extremely
attenuated "connection" to non-party NYU Langone Medical Center,
6

Plaintiff believes that such information might help identify the
person who posted the Statement.

While the court is sympathetic to

plaintiff's desire to ascertain the identity of that person, such
identification would not cure the untimeliness of this action, let
alone the untimeliness of an action against a defendant other than
Dr. Cremer.
The court notes that, significantly, the subpoena, which was
served to obtain such electronically stored information from nonparty NYU Langone Medical CenterS was not served until on or about
April 30,

2010,

already run.

after the applicable statute of limitations had

Thus, the within action is not timely and must be

dismissed.

Dismissal for Failure to State a Cause of Action
Additionally, as explained further below, even if this action
was found to be timely, dismissal is warranted for failure to state
a

cause

of

acti o n,

as

the

alleged

defamatory

statements

are

that I attended a completely distinct entity: NYU Law School- over
30 years ago.
Plaintiff also bases an unwarranted claim of bias merely
because she disagrees with the issuance of the November 28, 2011
order, which simply requested an explanation as to how an appellate
court was able to review an "appellate record" markedly different
than the one this trial court considered, as no reply was submitted
to this Part or considered in rendering the September 9, 2010
decision denying contempt.
See also footnote 9, infra, for a detailed discussion on
plaintiff's unwarranted accusations.
This non-party subpoena was the subject of the September
22, 2011 Appellate Division decision.
7
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statements of opinion, and, thus, are not actionable.

Expressions

of opinion are distinct from assertions of fact and cannot be the
subject of an action for defamation.
276

(2008)

Mann v. Abel, 10 NY3d 271,

(citing Weiner v. Doubleday and Co.,

74 NY2d 586, 593

(1989) ) .
Here, the statement was posted, anonymously, on an Internet
message board - a format and forum commonly used by unidentified
wri ters

to

make

opinions.

Such website

medical doctors.
factual

unsupported

and

often

baseless

specifically calls

for

as sertions

of

opinions as

to

The anonymous statement contains no accompanying

description

and

no

details

describing

any

particular

interaction that the poster may have had with Dr. Tener.

Indeed,

as plaintiff herself concedes, the posting "was made alone without
factual support to the statement.
Further,

in a

u

claim for

PI.'s Opp.Brief at 8.
defamation,

"the words must be

construed in the context of the entire statement as a whole, tested
against

the

reasonably

understanding
susceptible

a

the

average

defamatory

reader,

meaning,

and
they

if

not

are

not

Dillon v. Ci ty of New York, 261 AD2d 34, 38 (1st Dept

actionable."
1999) .

of

of

Here,

the Vitals. com website, specifically states in its

"Terms of use U that, "Vitals and the Content include statements of
opinion and not statements of fact . .. " (emphasis supplied).

Aff. Ex. 2.

6

Wang

Thus, any reasonable person using Vitals.com has been

The court notes that, in opposition, plaintiff has not
argued that such "Terms of use" were not in effect at the time of
the subject posting.
8

expressly put on notice that the postings contained on such website
are mere opinions, and not based upon facts.
As

stated by

the

Sandals Resorts Intl.

Appellate

Division,

Ltd. v. Google,

Inc.,

First
(86

Department

in

AD3d 32 [pt Dept

2011J), a case involving allegedly defamatory anonymous emails sent
to

multiple

corporation's

undisclosed
treatment

recipients
of

native

that
Jamaicans,

criticized
in

the

affirming

dismissal:
readers give less credence to allegedly defamatory
remarks published on the Internet than to similar remarks
made in other contexts ... Indeed, the anonymity ... makes it
more likely that a reasonable reader would view its
assertions with some skepticism and tend to treat it
contents as opinion rather than as fact.

Id. at 44 (emphasis supplied).

Significantly, the First Department

further instructed that,
[t] he culture of Internet communications, as distinct
from that of print media such as newspapers and
magazines, has been characterized as encouraging a
'freewheeling, anything-goes writing style' ... ' 'It is
imperative that courts learn to view libel allegations
wi thin the unique context of the Internet. In determining
whether a plaintiff's complaint includes a published
"false and defamatory statement concerning another",
commentators have argued that the defamatory import of
the communication must be viewed in light of the fact
that bulletin boards and chat rooms "are often the
repository of a wide range .of casual, emotive, and
imprecise speech," and that the online "recipients of
[offensive] statements do not necessarily attribute the
BaIne level of credence to the statements [that] they
would accord to statements made in other contexts".
Id.

at 43-44

(citations omittedj

emphasis supplied).7

Thus, in

Sandals Resorts IntI. Ltd.
supra, involved pre-action
discovery of an alleged defamation claim, which the Appellate
Division denied.
I

9

accordance

with

the

prevailing

case

law

in

this

Department,

plaintiff has failed to assert an actionable claim.s
Defendant's and plaintiff's9 further requests, which were not
Defendant has also raised the issue that plaintiff's
original summons was jurisdictionally defective, which this court
need not reach.
The court notes that, while plaintiff has not, in fact,
filed a notice of motion seeking the recusal of this court on this
matter, plaintiff has made such request by letters to the court, to
the Supervising Judge, and in her attorney's affirmation in
opposition to the within motion. Overland Aff.in Opp., ~8-9.
It is
hornbook law, however, that requests of the court are to be made by
notice of motion, in order to provide notice, to allow parties an
opportunity to submit opposition, rather than inserted randomly in
submissions or by letters to the Judge. See CPLR 2214 (a) .
Moreover, there is no provision in the CPLR which authorizes motion
practice by letter. The high volume of this Court's case-load,
makes letter writing an extremely difficult, if not impossible
tool, to address parties' requests and concerns.
Plaintiff's
outlandish claim with respect to recusal does not merit a response,
but, undoubtedly, will be raised on appeal by plaintiff;
therefore, the court will briefly address it.
Apparently, in seeking recusal, based on alleged "Internet
research" conducted as to this court's "background", plaintiff's
counsel relies on his client's accusations without a filter.
Ironically
and
incredibly,
plaintiff
(who
complains
of
"defamation U ) and her attorney, have accused this court of being
biased against plaintiff, in favor of a non-party, NYU Langone
Medical Center, claiming that I attended and received funding to
attend school from a totally distinct entity under NYU's massive
umbrella of institutions: NYU Law School.
While plaintiff is correct that I graduated from NYU Law
School -over 30 years ago- I note that at least one of the
Appellate Division judges who presided over the previous appeal in
this case, if not more, did so as well; yet, plaintiff made no
such request
for
recusal at
the Appellate Division.
Not
surprisingly, plaintiff only requested recusal, when this court
issued rulings, which she did not agree with, concluding that the
only reason is that it "must have u been the result of "bias".
Further, plaintiff and her attorney are absolutely incorrect
in their assertion that NYU funded a scholarship for my law school
education, which, ironically, points to the inherent danger of
relying on "Internet research". Nor does plaintiff's raising of the
spector of "appearance of impropriety" form a basis of recusal.
Plaintiff's allegations of recusal amount to nothing more than a
"sour grapes" litigation tactic. " [W]hen there is no ground for
recusal, recusal should not be ordered." Silber v. Silber, 84 AD3d
10

included in the notice of motion as part of the relief being sought
are denied. See CPLR 2214(a).

Accordingly,

it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is granted, and the
complaint is dismissed with costs as calculated by the Clerk of the
Court upon the submission of an appropriate bill of costs; and it
is further
ORDERED that

the

Clerk is directed to enter judgment

accordingly; and it is further

ORDERED

that

within 45

days

of

entry of this order,

defendant shall serve a copy upon plaintiff, with notice of entry.

Doris Ling-Cohan, J.S.C.
J; \ DiBmi~B\TENER . cremer .

final.wpd

F, LED
AUG 01 20'2
NEW YORK
COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE

931,932 (2nd Dept 2011) i see also People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405
(1987), Katz v Denzer, 70 AD2d 548, 548-549 (1st Dept 1979) i R & R
Capital LLC v Merritt, 56 AD3d 370, 370 (1st Dept 2008).
Moreover, as NYU (Medical Center, Law or any other part of
NYU) is not even a party to this case, recusal is absolutely not
warranted.
See alsofootnote 4, supra, which also addresses plaintiff's
claims of recusal.
11

